Archive for the 'philosophy' Category

Baruch de Spinoza

Es gibt in der Natur nichts Zufälliges, sondern alles ist gemäss der Notwendigkeit der göttlichen Natur bestimmt, auf gewisse Weise da zu sein und zu wirken.

Nothing in nature is accidental, everything is determined by the necessity of divine nature to exist and act in a certain way.

I do not know how to teach philosophy without becoming a disturber of established religion.

Ich weiss nicht wie man Philosophie lehren kann ohne etablierte Religion zu verstören.

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

Nichts ist widerwärtiger als die Majorität, denn sie besteht aus wenigen kräftigen Vorgängern, aus Schelmen, die sich akkomodieren, aus Schwachen, die sich assimilieren und der Masse, die nachtrollt, ohne nur im mindesten zu wissen, was sie will.

Nothing is more disgusting than the majority, because it consists of a few strong forerunners, of imps who accommodate themselves, of weaklings who assimilate, and of the masses who imitate without knowing in the least what they want.

Oscar Wilde

Nowadays people know the price of everything and the value of nothing.

Heutzutage wissen die Leute den Preis von allem und den Wert von nichts.

(My translations)

Jedoch nimm nichts zu ernst, selbst Zitate nicht:

(However don’t take anything, even quotes, too seriously:)

Der verrückte Maler von (the jolly painter by) Klaus Rohde:

“Damned, again, nothing sold today (Verdammt, wieder heute nichts verkauft)”

(A quote by, Zitat von Klaus Rohde)

In his brilliant book “The Black Swan. The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Penguin Books, 2007″ Nassim Nicholas Taleb argues that unlikely, unforeseeable events are of extreme importance, much more so than probable ones, in history, politics, science, etc. However, attention is usually paid to the latter. This reinforces my view, expressed in several earlier posts, on the importance of nonequilibrium conditions in ecology, and on the danger of making political decisions based on equilibrium assumptions (click Nash equilibria in politics). In this post I briefly draw attention to his views on developments in modern philosophy, which agree with what I said about the hairsplitting in discussions of the “Nonidentity Problem”, and about “Postmodern Philosophy”.

Here are some extracts from his book (Prologue: pp. xxvii-xxviii):

“Talk is cheap.”

…

“Indeed those who read too much Wittgenstein ……. may be under the impression that language problems are important. They may certainly be important to attain prominence in philosophy departments”, but for not much else.

“Thus I rail against sterile skepticism”, the kind we can do nothing about, and against the exceedingly theoretical language problems that have made much of modern philosophy largely irrelevant to what is derisively called the “general public”. ” One reason, according to Taleb, is that academics in abstract disciplines depend on each other’s opinion, without having any external checks.

(Taleb is Professor in the Sciences of Uncertainty at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and author of the bestselling (in 18 languages) “Fooled by Randomness”)

I have just started reading the book and may return to it later. I know little about Wittgenstein, hence comments by professional philosophers and others would be most welcome.

I have commented on this in a previous post. The full article is now available on the web.

Click here :

http://www.tilgher.it/biologiae.html

Go to “latest issue”, to “News and Views”, to “free full text”.

What is postmodern philosophy? Has it a clear meaning? Apparently not, since postmodern philosophers claim that there is no absolute truth in anything. Hence, nothing can be clearly defined.

From Wikipedia:

“Some writers and theorists fear Kalle Lasn’s description of our contemporary society” (Kalle Lasn & Bruce Grierson, A Malignant Sadness, ADBUSTERS #30, June/July 2000):
“Post-modernism is arguably the most depressing philosophy ever to spring from the western mind. It is difficult to talk about post-modernism because nobody really understands it. It’s allusive to the point of being impossible to articulate. But what this philosophy basically says is that we’ve reached an endpoint in human history. That the modernist tradition of progress and ceaseless extension of the frontiers of innovation are now dead. Originality is dead. The avant-garde artistic tradition is dead. All religions and utopian visions are dead and resistance to the status quo is impossible because revolution too is now dead. Like it or not, we humans are stuck in a permanent crisis of meaning, a dark room from which we can never escape.”

So, what is all the fuzz about? One might argue about whether there is truth in many statements about philosophy, religion, ethics, among others, not to mention politics, but is there really no truth in science? . Anyway, what is truth?

Als emeritierter Professor hat man Zeit, sich gründlicher mit politischer Problematik und mit Geschichte (ohne die ein Verständniss der gegenwärtigen Politik kaum möglich ist) zu befassen. Wie macht man das am besten? Meiner Ansicht nach hilft es auf jeden Fall, wenn man sich vor Ort informiert. So war ich kürzlich in Malaysia und Vietnam, um mich an Ort und Stelle mit den gegenwärtigen Entwicklungen vertraut zu machen. Ich lebte 1960 bis 1967 in Malaysia, und habe es in den folgenden Jahren wiederholt besucht, das letzte Mal vor etwa 5-6 Jahren. Mein Vietnambesuch war der erste.

MALAYSIA: Der Fortschritt in Malaysia seit der Unabhängigkeit ist erstaunlich. Ein modernes Autostrassensystem, ein moderner Flughafen, eine aus dem Boden gestampfte neue Hauptstadt (Putrajaya) nicht weit von Kuala Lumpur. 1960 ging die Autofahrt von Singapore nach Kuala Lumpur über eine gewundene enge Strasse durch Gummi- und Ölpalmenplantagen, und zum Teil durch den Dschungel, heute geht das einige Male schneller über eine moderne Autostrasse. Die Fortschritte sind sicherlich zu einem grossen Teil auf die Zukunftsvision und die Energie des letzten Premierministers Dr. Mohammed Mahathir zurückzuführen (der erst kürzlich seinen common sense unter Beweis stellte, als er in London auf einer islamischen Konferenz erklärte, Bush, Blair und Howard sollten als Kriegsverbrecher wegen der Invasion des Iraq vor einen internationalen Gerichtshof gestellt werden).“ Es gab immer Spannungen zwischen den Volksgruppen in Malaysia (Malaien, Chinesen, Inder), die sich 1969 in Rassenkrawallen mit Toten entluden, doch scheinen diese Spannungen seitdem einigermassen unter Kontrolle gehalten worden zu sein. Insgesamt war mein Eindruck sehr positiv, und man kann Malaysia nur das allerbeste für die Zukunft wünschen.

VIETNAM: Mein Besuch beschränkte sich auf Ho Chi Minh City, mit vielen Besuchen verschiedener Museen, von Märkten und einer Wasserpuppen-Vorführung, eine alte vietnamesische Tradition. Ich brachte viel Zeit damit zu, über den Vietnamkrieg nachzulesen und die angelesenen Informationen in Museen zu vertiefen. Die Leute sehr freundlich, intelligent und energisch. Millionen im Vietnamkrieg umgebracht, und Vergiftungen durch die en gros abgeworfenen Herbizide immer noch neu erworben. Wofür das alles? Man lese nach in:

Marc Frey: Geschichte des Vietnamkrieges. Die Tragödie in Asien und das Ende des amerikanischen Traumes. Zweite Auflage Verlag C.H. Beck, München 1999.

Marc Frey ist (oder war) wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Nordamerikaprogramm der Universität Bonn. Seine Hauptarbeitsgebiete sind die amerikanische Zeitgeschichte und die Geschichte der Dekolonisierung in Südostasien.

Leute, die sich mit europäischer Geschichte befassen, lassen andere Gebiete oft völlig ausser Acht. Aber ist es nicht wichtig, die Motive verschiedener Nationen (oder vielmehr ihrer Regierungen) zu verstehen, indem man ihre Handlungen in anderen Gegenden der Erde ebenfalls berücksichtigt? Das erste grosse Morden im 20. Jahrhundert fand wohl im amerikanisch-philippinischen Krieg statt (bis zu einer Million Zivilisten getötet), und der Vietnamkrieg war der am längsten dauernde Krieg des 20. Jahrhunderts, mit weitaus massiveren Flächenbombardierungen als im 2. Weltkrieg.

Übrigens: sowohl in Malaysia wie auch in Vietnam fällt auf, dass junge Menschen das Strassenbild bestimmen (Millionen von kleinen Motorrädern in Ho Chi Minh City, meist mit jungen Leuten! Man braucht so einigen Mut, sich über die Strassen zu wagen). Kommt man dagegen nach Europa oder Australien: weitaus vergreister!

In a previous post I discussed the non-identity problem.

Here I present examples illustrating three aspects of the Problem.

FIRST EXAMPLE: One problem raised in a seminar on the Problem was whether a cat, which - by some as yet undiscovered procedure - would have acquired human mental abilities, should be given the same moral considerations as humans. Look at the pictures: “cats” in the upper and genuine “humans” in the lower row. Aren’t the little “human” cat and her family sweet? After all, the supposed great mental abilities have led to some other, more “human”, changes as well. Do you recognize any significant differences between the two groups except for the bigger ears in the “cats”? Would you agree that, in spite of the big ears, they are as sweet or sweeter than the family in the second row, entirely human derived ? But does this qualify them for humane treatment? What makes a being human? And do only human beings qualify for moral considerations and humane treatment?

SECOND EXAMPLE: An important assumption of the non-identity problem is “the fact that the identities of those affected by our choices may be altered by the choices we make (that is, different people may come to exist if we make one choice rather than another)”. Quite true, of course, but how many of the perceived changes are indeed the result of intentional actions subject to moral judgments? Look at the possible outcomes of fairly minor genetic alterations:

Well, how many mutations were involved? - Probably not many, and none of them deliberately induced. And don’t forget: many mutations are pleiotropic, i.e., they cause not a single change, but many. Are all these representatives of possible future generations simply freak accidents in evolution? Which of the types qualifies most for our moral considerations? Which one do we want to populate the future Earth? These freaks cannot even agree on the type of favourite ball game: on the left the most primitive of the games, rugby, on the right one not yet seen in the recent world, but what does it matter: all players seem to be quite happy with their particular toy.

THIRD EXAMPLE: what is the better outcome: 50 billion people on Earth living just above the existence minimum, but most people still better off than if they were non-existent? Or: 10 billion people living a much “happier” existence? Or : Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, even happier? A decision is difficult. If we want to maximise “happiness”, do we chose the greatest “total” happiness (50 or 10 billlion people), or the greatest “average” happiness (Adam and Eve, if they are or were indeed happier). Too complicated for me. I leave the decision to the professor below who is ruminating about the Problem.

But don’t forget, the decision to limit population numbers may affect you: you or your direct offspring may not be among those chosen to survive!

A few days ago I attended a philosophy seminar at UNE on the non-identity problem. I had never heard of this before and was intrigued. In the following some ideas which I put up for discussion.

Derek Parfit, an English philosopher, has formulated the non-identity problem in his book “Reasons and Persons”. The problem is important in bioethics, helping us to judge about the morality of actions that may affect future generations. In the following, I use the summary of John Nolt to critically examine some of the points made by Parfit. My comments in bold and italics. I must point out, however, that I have not read Parfit’s book and wish to see this post as a basis for discussion and not more. Parfit, apparently, draws attention to paradoxes arising from various assumptions, and I am not sure at which conclusion he finally arrives. The problems discussed are certainly important, with consequences for environmental policy and population control, among others.

Summary of Parfit, Chs. 16-17 by John Nolt

“Chapter 16: The Non-Identity Problem

Chapter 16’s title seems to denote two closely-related ideas:

(1) the fact that the identities of those affected by our choices may be altered by the choices we make (that is, different people may come to exist if we make one choice rather than another), and
(2) the problem of constructing a true moral theory (which Parfit calls Theory X) that is adequate to deal with this fact.
(ad 1): I thought it is self-evident that many of our actions, often very small and unintentional ones, may affect who comes into existence later. But does it matter? Is it really important who comes into existence, as long as somebody does? We have no or little control over most of our actions, consequences of our actions are often non-intentional, and therefore not subject to moral judgments. Even if some of our actions are so significant and strong that they must have some important effects on future generations, we have no way of assessing what future generations would have looked like without our imput.
(ad 2): From the last sentence of my comment on (1) it follows that a “true moral theory” dealing with “the fact that the identities of those affected by our choices may be altered by the choices we make”, if at all possible, will not be able, in principle, to cover a large and possibly the largest part of our actions.

With regard to (1) Parfit argues that a large-scale public policy may in a couple of centuries so change the course of events that no one will exist who would have existed had a different policy been adopted. This follows, Parfit thinks, from: The Time-Dependence Claim: If any particular person had not been conceived within a month of the time when he was in fact conceived, he would in fact never have existed (351). Why within a month? Certainly even a second may make all the difference, because different sperm would almost certainly be involved. Of course the fact that policy choices might completely alter a population does not follow from the time-dependence claim alone. Some auxiliary assumptions must be also made about the effects of public policies on human reproduction. Parfit also assumes that one could not have been conceived by parents other than one’s actual parents. (This and the time-dependence claim seem questionable only from such unlikely metaphysical standpoints as the doctrine of pre-existence of souls.) These necessary auxiliary assumptions seem plausible. It is true, of course, that different parents could not have produced me, but the same parents may produce different offspring, not only because the genes in eggs and sperm differ, but also because the time of conception and birth is important. A baby is likely to be very sensitive to its first experiences in the womb and after birth (compare the imprinting of birds: probably not as clearcut in humans, but nevertheless of some importance, although I admit that my knowledge of develomental psychology is non-existent). Or take the example of identical twins: they are indeed very similar, but still different identities. Not only the genes, but the environmental conditions guiding the expression of genes, are important in forming the character of a person. But even if environmental conditions are practically identical, the fact of spatial separateness would still make them different identities.

Parfit next observes that moral choices are of three kinds:

1 The same people will have existed regardless of which action we take (same-people choices)
Many of one’s actions will not affect who will come into existence, but many others will, and many of them unintentional and beyond our control.
2 Different people will have existed if we take one action rather than others, but their numbers will have been the same (same-number choices)
Same comment as for previous.
3 Different numbers of (different) people will have existed depending on our choice (different-number choices).
Same as for last two points.

Traditional moral thinking usually concerns same-people choices. (This is true even in life-and-death decisions, because even if a person dies as a result of a decision, that person will still have existed.) But moral thinking about future generations usually concerns different-number choices. Same-number choices are an intermediate case. Chapter 16 examines same-number choices as a preliminary to considering different number choices, which are more problematic.
The appropriate moral principles for same-number choices, according to Parfit, are:

The Same Number Quality Claim (Q): If in either of two possible outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it would be worse if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived. (360) We do not have any real control over who might live and who might not and The No-Difference View: It makes no difference to the morality of an act whether the same people or different people will have existed if we act otherwise. (367, 369) As for last point The No-Difference View can be more fully articulated as follows: If choice C1 is between outcome A and outcome B happening to the same people and choice C2 is between outcome A happening to one set of people and outcome B happening to a different set, then there is no moral difference between the choices (outcome A is of equal value in either choice, and so is outcome B).
Q and the No-Difference View, both of which Parfit affirms, conflict with a plausible alternative:

The Person-Affecting View (V): It will be worse if [specific] people [who would exist no matter what we choose] are affected for the worse. (370) I take this to mean: if choice C1 is between outcome A and outcome B happening to the same people and choice C2 is between outcome A happening to one set of people and outcome B happening to a different set, and if outcome B is the worst of the two, then B is worse if it results from choice C1 rather than from choice C2.
But another interpretation is: If choice C is between outcome A and outcome B and B is worse for some people (who would exist in A) than A is

Parfit illustrates the differences among these views by various hypothetical examples. Among these are:

The example of depletion vs. conservation: Under the policy of depletion the quality of life would be slightly better for everyone for 200 years than under conservation but thereafter it would be considerably worse. Parfit supposes that after 200 years of the policy of depletion an entirely different population will exist than would have if conservation had been the policy. Hence depletion benefits those who live for the first 200 years and is worse for no one who is born later (since without the policy these people would not have existed: At first glance this statement seems to be nonsense. Are those people who do exist - although they are not the same as those who would exist without our actions - not worth considering?). It is therefore worse for no one, period. (Nevertheless, Q implies that depletion is wrong. V, by contrast, implies that conservation is wrong because depletion is worse for no one, but conservation is worse for those who live in the first 200 years.)
The example of two medical programs: Two proposed medical programs have identical costs and effects, except that one would cure 1000 already existing fetuses of a handicap, while the other would instead of curing these fetuses prevent the same handicap in 1000 people yet to be conceived. (V implies that the policy which would prevent the handicap is worse, but the No-Difference View implies that these policies are morally equivalent.)

Parfit thinks these examples show that we should accept Q and the No-Difference View and reject V. If so, then we have sound principles for dealing with same-number choices. That is the main point of Chapter 16. Though Parfit’s view is intuitively appealing, this is not a conclusive argument. There may be many other ways of justifying one policy over the other in each of these examples.
Parfit does consider one such alternative justification: that depletion is bad not because it lowers the general quality of life but because it violates the rights of future generations. But there are, as he notes, at least two problems with this claim. One is that it is not obvious that future generations have a right to a high quality of life (especially if, as in Parfit’s example, their quality of life, even in the depletion scenario, is higher than ours). The second problem is that we can hardly be said to be violating the rights of people by depleting the resources available to them if the only other option (as in Parfit’s example) is that they never exist. People’s rights cannot, in other words, be violated by a policy to which they owe their (reasonably worthwhile) existence.

Finally, Parfit draws a preliminary conclusion about the desired theory X. Many moral theories evaluate an action as better or worse only insofar as it is better or worse for the people whom it affects. Parfit characterizes such theories as having a person-affecting form (371, 378). Parfit argues that the correct general theory X will not have a person-affecting form. He claims that this conclusion follows from the No-Difference View together with the assumption that to cause to exist is not a benefit. This argument, first developed on pp. 369-371, and summarized at the bottom of p. 378, may be more fully articulated as follows:

(1) It makes no difference to the morality of an act whether the same people or different people will have existed if we act otherwise. (No-Difference View)
This does not make sense. How can we possibly know whether the same or different people will exist in the future (see above)
(2) Causing to exist is not a benefit.

(3) There is a unique true theory X.

So (4) The true theory X will not have a person-affecting form (i.e., will not consider an action as better or worse only insofar as it is better or worse for the people whom it affects). Unfortunately, the conclusion doesn’t follow directly from the stated premises. Yet I think we can make sense of the argument by considering that there are only two ways in which an act A might be better or worse for a person whom it effects: (i) This person would have existed regardless of whether we chose an alternative action, but A is better or worse for her than the alternatives
(ii) This person would never have existed on at least some of the alternatives to A—that is, act A is part of what causes her to exist and is in that sense a benefit to her.

Now if we assume that causing to exist is not a benefit, then the only remaining way in which an act might be better or worse for a person whom it effects is if it is the result of a choice in which this person would have existed regardless of what we chose. This seems hairsplitting to me. As above: we do not know how our actions can affect the existence or non-existence of future people. Hence (still assuming that causing to exist is not a benefit), any true theory with a person-affecting form will evaluate an act as better or worse only if it is the result of a choice in which the same people would exist regardless of what we choose (same-person choice). As above: we have little control over who will exist. Therefore: (P) If causing to exist is not a benefit, then any true theory with a person-affecting form must imply that it makes some difference to the morality of an act whether the same people or different people will have existed if we act otherwise. —for our very ability to evaluate the act morally will depend on whether the same people or different people will have existed if we act otherwise.
If we now add (P) to premises (1)-(3), we obtain a valid argument that I think adequately reflects Parfit’s reasoning. Doubt remains, of course, concerning its soundness, for premises (1), (2) and (3) all are questionable.

Chapter 17: The Repugnant Conclusion

This short chapter discusses an anomaly that arises in different-number choices. The problem is that in large populations, each additional person born may lower the quality of life for all (due to overcrowding, competition for limited resources, etc.). But the total quality of life that that additional person enjoys may nevertheless outweigh the total loss of quality of life to everyone else. If so, then (assuming—and this assumption is crucial—that our goal is to maximize total quality of life) it is better for the population to increase, even though that increase may lower everyone’s quality of life, even to a level at which it is barely worth living. But this conclusion seems paradoxical and absurd. How can we possibly control all this? Parfit therefore calls it The Repugnant Conclusion. The principle that engenders the paradox is:

The Impersonal Total Principle: If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which there would be the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living. (387) If we take what makes life to be worth living as happiness, this is the classic utilitarian idea of maximizing happiness. What The Repugnant Conclusion is supposed to show is that classical utilitarianism and any other theories that assume the Impersonal Total Principle fail as candidates for Theory X. They fail, specifically, because they imply The Repugnant Conclusion (which is absurd) in certain different-number choices involving population growth.
The paradox results from the fact that in a growing population it is possible for total quality of life to increase while the average quality of life (quality per person) decreases. We might, then, in an effort to escape The Repugnant Conclusion, suppose that it is average quality of life that matters. If so, we might affirm:

The Impersonal Average Principle: If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which people’s lives go, on average, best. (386) Parfit will later show that this principle too engenders paradox.”

Considering all my previous comments, it seems to me that many of the ideas related to the non-identity problem are somewhat obscure. Who can possibly know how most of our actions will affect who will be in existence in the future and who will not. Most of our actions are unintentional, but nevertheless may have immense effects on what will happen. Remember the butterfly effect! Furthermore: it seems to me quite irrelevant to base moral judgements on whether the “same” or different people will be affected by our actions. The reason: we do not know and cannot know in principle what a future person or a future population would look like without imput from our actions. All we can hope for is that important personal or government actions will make it likely that future conditions are beneficial to mankind as a whole. And this includes policies which guarantee that resources on Earth are never over-exploited. —- Finally, in a discussion of the non-identity problem the question was raised whether a cat who by means of some treatment had acquired human mental powers, would qualify for the same moral considerations as humans. Of course it would: it would be human! —- This leads to another point: the discussion of non-identity seems to be restricted to humans (but I may be wrong on this, I am not familiar with most of the literature). I conclude with Schopenhauer:

“Die vermeintliche Rechtlosigkeit der Tiere, der Wahn, dass unser Handeln gegen sie ohne moralische Bedenken sei, ist eine geradezu empörende Barbarei des Abendlandes. Die Tiere sind kein Fabrikat zu unserem Gebrauch. Nicht Erbarmen, sondern Gerechtigkeit ist man den Tieren schuldig.
The supposed rightlessness of animals, the delusion that we can act towards them without moral scruples, is a really disgusting barbarity of the Western world. Animals are not constructs for our use. We owe them justness and not mercy.”

Schopenhauers moral philosophy based on compassion with the suffering of animals and man, appears to be a sounder basis of ethical judgments than the hairsplitting related to the non-identity problem. But I repeat: I know very little of the literature and put this post up as a basis for discussion, and only that.

THE AIM OF ALL THE ABOVE: I HOPE THAT GENUINE PHILOSOPHERS WILL CONTRIBUTE SOME COMMENTS!

Friedrich II. von Preussen, Projekt Gutenberg, Der Spiegel
Man müsste es dahin bringen, dass sich alle Menschen des Fanatismus und der Intoleranz schämen.
One should bring about that all men are ashamed of fanaticism and intolerance.

Schopenhauer, in Bezug auf die Wahrheit, Schopenhauer, with regard to truth
Wenn man einen Teeloeffel Wein in ein Fass Jauche giesst, ist das Resultat Jauche. Wenn man einen Teelöffel Jauche in ein Fass Wein giesst, ist das Resultat ebenfalls Jauche.
If you pour a teaspoon of wine into a barrel of manure, you get manure, if you pour a teaspoon of manure into a barrel of wine, you also get manure.

Georg Christoph Lichtenberg Projekt Gutenberg, Der Spiegel
Dass in Kirchen gepredigt wird macht deswegen die Blitzableiter auf ihnen nicht unnötig.
Preaching in churches does not make lightning conductors there superfluous.

Georg Christoph Lichtenberg Projekt Gutenberg, Der Spiegel
Ein Gelübde zu tun ist eine grössere Sünde, als es zu brechen.
It is a greater sin to take an oath than to break one.

Georg Christoph Lichtenberg Projekt Gutenberg, Der Spiegel.
Vergleichung zwischen einem Prediger und einem Schlosser.¨Der erste sagt: du sollst nicht stehlen wollen; und der andere: du sollst nicht stehlen können.
Comparison of a preacher and a locksmith. The former says: You must not wish to steal, and the latter: you must not be able to steal.

Klopstock, Epigramme. Projekt Gutenberg, der Spiegel
Widriger sind mir die redenden, als die schreibenden Schwätzer: Diese leg’ ich weg; jenen entflieh’ ich nicht stets.
Babblers who talk are worse than babblers who write. The latter I can put aside, from the former I cannot always escape.

Franz Grillparzer, Projekt Gutenberg, Der Spiegel
Die Schönheit ist die vollkommene Uebereinstimmung des Sinnlichen mit dem Geistigen.
Beauty is the perfect accord of the sensual and the spiritual.

I have briefly discussed Plato’s archetypes and vacant niches in two previous posts ( here and here). The detailed paper on this topic has now been accepted for publication.

Klaus Rohde: Vacant niches and the Possible Operation of Natural Laws in Ecosystems, Rivista di Biologia / Biology Forum 101 (2008)

I draw attention to the book “The conventional lies of civilized mankind” (1883) by Max Nordau, in which he critically analyzed the situation of western mankind before the first world war. He concludes with an optimistic note suggesting that future relations should be governed by solidarity and not greed (Selbstsucht), but it seems that none of his optimism has fulfilled itself. I ask: has there been progress in history?

Max Nordau (1849 bis 1923) schrieb einige sehr einflussreiche Bücher, in denen er die Lage der Zeit (vor dem ersten Weltkrieg) analysiert. Hier ist der erste Satz aus “Mene, Tekel, Upharsin” und der letzte Abschnitt aus “Schlussharmonie” aus seinem Buch “Die konventionellen Lügen der Kulturmenschheit’ (erste Auflage 1883), in dem er seine Hoffnung für die Zukunft ausdrückt (http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/?id=5&xid=4295&kapitel=1#gb_found)

“Die Menschheit, die gleich Faust Erkenntniss und Glück sucht, war vielleicht zu keiner Zeit so weit entfernt wie jetzt, dem Augenblicke zuzurufen: “Verweile doch, du bist so schön!”

“Aber nicht blos die Quelle aller Moral, sondern auch die aller Einrichtungen muss die Solidarität werden. In den bestehenden Formen kommt der Egoismus zum Ausdruck, die Formen, welche ihre Stelle einzunehmen berufen sind, wird der Altruismus vorzeichnen. Die Selbstsucht erweckt den Wunsch, Andere zu beherrschen, sie führt zum Despotismus, sie macht Könige, Eroberer, eigennützige Minister und Parteiführer, die Gattungsliebe gibt den Wunsch ein, der Gesammtheit zu dienen, sie führt zur Selbstverwaltung, zur Selbstbestimmung, zu einer Gesetzgebung, die blos von der Rücksicht auf das Gemeinwesen inspirirt ist. Die Selbstsucht ist die Ursache der schlimmsten Ungerechtigkeiten in der Gütervertheilung, die Solidarität gleicht diese Ungerechtigkeiten so weit aus, dass Bildung und tägliches Brod jedem Bildungsfähigen und Arbeitswilligen gesichert sind. Der Kampf ums Dasein wird so lange währen wie das Leben selbst und er wird immer die Ursache aller Entwicklung und Vervollkommnung sein; aber er wird mildere Formen annehmen und sich zu seinem heutigen
Wüthen so verhalten wie die Kriegführung gebildeter Nationen zum Würgen von Menschenfressern. Auf die Zivilisation von heute, deren Kennzeichen Pessimismus, Lüge und Selbstsucht sind, sehe ich eine Zivilisation der Wahrheit, der Nächstenliebe, des Frohmuths folgen. Die Menschheit, die heute ein abstrakter Begriff ist, wird dann eine Thatsache sein. Glücklich die spätergeborenen Geschlechter, denen es beschieden sein wird, umspielt von der reinen Luft der Zukunft, übergossen von ihrem hellern Sonnenschein, in diesem Bruderbunde zu leben, wahr, wissend, frei und gut!”

Ich überlasse dem Leser das Urteil darüber, ob sich Nordaus Wunsch erfüllt hat. Ist der Atomkrieg, die Kriegführung gebildeter Nationen, tatsächlich ein Fortschritt gegenüber dem Würgen von Menschenfressern? Und ist, was zu Nordaus Zeiten ein Wunsch war, immer nur noch ein frommer Wunsch? Wo bleibt da der Fortschritt der Menschheit?

Insgesamt, das Buch ist heute ebenso anregend wie vor 130 Jahren: eine tiefschürfende Analyse der politischen, religiösen und wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen jener und unserer Zeit. Und, da - wie wir gerade gesehen haben - sich anscheinend wenig verändert hat, sollten wir zumindest den Optimismus Nordaus wachhalten. Bitter notwendig, wie unter anderem hier zu sehen.