Archive for the 'environment' Category

Google has opened a new free encyclopedia “Knol” (abbreviation of Knowledge). It has certain advantages over Wikipedia, with which it will compete: 1) articles are published under their authors’ names; 2) authors have the option to exclude any changes by readers, allow changes which must be approved by the author, or allow any changes; 3) articles can be reviewed; 4) articles on the same topic by different authors are accepted; 5) it is possible to write comments on articles.
I published an article (in German) on Meeresparasiten (marine parasites) in Knol. Have a look:

http://knol.google.com/k/klaus-rohde/meeresparasiten-wirtschaftliche-und/xk923bc3gp4/2#

In his brilliant book “The Black Swan. The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Penguin Books, 2007″ Nassim Nicholas Taleb argues that unlikely, unforeseeable events are of extreme importance, much more so than probable ones, in history, politics, science, etc. However, attention is usually paid to the latter. This reinforces my view, expressed in several earlier posts, on the importance of nonequilibrium conditions in ecology, and on the danger of making political decisions based on equilibrium assumptions (click Nash equilibria in politics). In this post I briefly draw attention to his views on developments in modern philosophy, which agree with what I said about the hairsplitting in discussions of the “Nonidentity Problem”, and about “Postmodern Philosophy”.

Here are some extracts from his book (Prologue: pp. xxvii-xxviii):

“Talk is cheap.”

…

“Indeed those who read too much Wittgenstein ……. may be under the impression that language problems are important. They may certainly be important to attain prominence in philosophy departments”, but for not much else.

“Thus I rail against sterile skepticism”, the kind we can do nothing about, and against the exceedingly theoretical language problems that have made much of modern philosophy largely irrelevant to what is derisively called the “general public”. ” One reason, according to Taleb, is that academics in abstract disciplines depend on each other’s opinion, without having any external checks.

(Taleb is Professor in the Sciences of Uncertainty at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and author of the bestselling (in 18 languages) “Fooled by Randomness”)

I have just started reading the book and may return to it later. I know little about Wittgenstein, hence comments by professional philosophers and others would be most welcome.

Als emeritierter Professor hat man Zeit, sich gründlicher mit politischer Problematik und mit Geschichte (ohne die ein Verständniss der gegenwärtigen Politik kaum möglich ist) zu befassen. Wie macht man das am besten? Meiner Ansicht nach hilft es auf jeden Fall, wenn man sich vor Ort informiert. So war ich kürzlich in Malaysia und Vietnam, um mich an Ort und Stelle mit den gegenwärtigen Entwicklungen vertraut zu machen. Ich lebte 1960 bis 1967 in Malaysia, und habe es in den folgenden Jahren wiederholt besucht, das letzte Mal vor etwa 5-6 Jahren. Mein Vietnambesuch war der erste.

MALAYSIA: Der Fortschritt in Malaysia seit der Unabhängigkeit ist erstaunlich. Ein modernes Autostrassensystem, ein moderner Flughafen, eine aus dem Boden gestampfte neue Hauptstadt (Putrajaya) nicht weit von Kuala Lumpur. 1960 ging die Autofahrt von Singapore nach Kuala Lumpur über eine gewundene enge Strasse durch Gummi- und Ölpalmenplantagen, und zum Teil durch den Dschungel, heute geht das einige Male schneller über eine moderne Autostrasse. Die Fortschritte sind sicherlich zu einem grossen Teil auf die Zukunftsvision und die Energie des letzten Premierministers Dr. Mohammed Mahathir zurückzuführen (der erst kürzlich seinen common sense unter Beweis stellte, als er in London auf einer islamischen Konferenz erklärte, Bush, Blair und Howard sollten als Kriegsverbrecher wegen der Invasion des Iraq vor einen internationalen Gerichtshof gestellt werden).“ Es gab immer Spannungen zwischen den Volksgruppen in Malaysia (Malaien, Chinesen, Inder), die sich 1969 in Rassenkrawallen mit Toten entluden, doch scheinen diese Spannungen seitdem einigermassen unter Kontrolle gehalten worden zu sein. Insgesamt war mein Eindruck sehr positiv, und man kann Malaysia nur das allerbeste für die Zukunft wünschen.

VIETNAM: Mein Besuch beschränkte sich auf Ho Chi Minh City, mit vielen Besuchen verschiedener Museen, von Märkten und einer Wasserpuppen-Vorführung, eine alte vietnamesische Tradition. Ich brachte viel Zeit damit zu, über den Vietnamkrieg nachzulesen und die angelesenen Informationen in Museen zu vertiefen. Die Leute sehr freundlich, intelligent und energisch. Millionen im Vietnamkrieg umgebracht, und Vergiftungen durch die en gros abgeworfenen Herbizide immer noch neu erworben. Wofür das alles? Man lese nach in:

Marc Frey: Geschichte des Vietnamkrieges. Die Tragödie in Asien und das Ende des amerikanischen Traumes. Zweite Auflage Verlag C.H. Beck, München 1999.

Marc Frey ist (oder war) wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Nordamerikaprogramm der Universität Bonn. Seine Hauptarbeitsgebiete sind die amerikanische Zeitgeschichte und die Geschichte der Dekolonisierung in Südostasien.

Leute, die sich mit europäischer Geschichte befassen, lassen andere Gebiete oft völlig ausser Acht. Aber ist es nicht wichtig, die Motive verschiedener Nationen (oder vielmehr ihrer Regierungen) zu verstehen, indem man ihre Handlungen in anderen Gegenden der Erde ebenfalls berücksichtigt? Das erste grosse Morden im 20. Jahrhundert fand wohl im amerikanisch-philippinischen Krieg statt (bis zu einer Million Zivilisten getötet), und der Vietnamkrieg war der am längsten dauernde Krieg des 20. Jahrhunderts, mit weitaus massiveren Flächenbombardierungen als im 2. Weltkrieg.

Übrigens: sowohl in Malaysia wie auch in Vietnam fällt auf, dass junge Menschen das Strassenbild bestimmen (Millionen von kleinen Motorrädern in Ho Chi Minh City, meist mit jungen Leuten! Man braucht so einigen Mut, sich über die Strassen zu wagen). Kommt man dagegen nach Europa oder Australien: weitaus vergreister!

In a previous post I discussed the non-identity problem.

Here I present examples illustrating three aspects of the Problem.

FIRST EXAMPLE: One problem raised in a seminar on the Problem was whether a cat, which - by some as yet undiscovered procedure - would have acquired human mental abilities, should be given the same moral considerations as humans. Look at the pictures: “cats” in the upper and genuine “humans” in the lower row. Aren’t the little “human” cat and her family sweet? After all, the supposed great mental abilities have led to some other, more “human”, changes as well. Do you recognize any significant differences between the two groups except for the bigger ears in the “cats”? Would you agree that, in spite of the big ears, they are as sweet or sweeter than the family in the second row, entirely human derived ? But does this qualify them for humane treatment? What makes a being human? And do only human beings qualify for moral considerations and humane treatment?

SECOND EXAMPLE: An important assumption of the non-identity problem is “the fact that the identities of those affected by our choices may be altered by the choices we make (that is, different people may come to exist if we make one choice rather than another)”. Quite true, of course, but how many of the perceived changes are indeed the result of intentional actions subject to moral judgments? Look at the possible outcomes of fairly minor genetic alterations:

Well, how many mutations were involved? - Probably not many, and none of them deliberately induced. And don’t forget: many mutations are pleiotropic, i.e., they cause not a single change, but many. Are all these representatives of possible future generations simply freak accidents in evolution? Which of the types qualifies most for our moral considerations? Which one do we want to populate the future Earth? These freaks cannot even agree on the type of favourite ball game: on the left the most primitive of the games, rugby, on the right one not yet seen in the recent world, but what does it matter: all players seem to be quite happy with their particular toy.

THIRD EXAMPLE: what is the better outcome: 50 billion people on Earth living just above the existence minimum, but most people still better off than if they were non-existent? Or: 10 billion people living a much “happier” existence? Or : Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, even happier? A decision is difficult. If we want to maximise “happiness”, do we chose the greatest “total” happiness (50 or 10 billlion people), or the greatest “average” happiness (Adam and Eve, if they are or were indeed happier). Too complicated for me. I leave the decision to the professor below who is ruminating about the Problem.

But don’t forget, the decision to limit population numbers may affect you: you or your direct offspring may not be among those chosen to survive!

A few days ago I attended a philosophy seminar at UNE on the non-identity problem. I had never heard of this before and was intrigued. In the following some ideas which I put up for discussion.

Derek Parfit, an English philosopher, has formulated the non-identity problem in his book “Reasons and Persons”. The problem is important in bioethics, helping us to judge about the morality of actions that may affect future generations. In the following, I use the summary of John Nolt to critically examine some of the points made by Parfit. My comments in bold and italics. I must point out, however, that I have not read Parfit’s book and wish to see this post as a basis for discussion and not more. Parfit, apparently, draws attention to paradoxes arising from various assumptions, and I am not sure at which conclusion he finally arrives. The problems discussed are certainly important, with consequences for environmental policy and population control, among others.

Summary of Parfit, Chs. 16-17 by John Nolt

“Chapter 16: The Non-Identity Problem

Chapter 16’s title seems to denote two closely-related ideas:

(1) the fact that the identities of those affected by our choices may be altered by the choices we make (that is, different people may come to exist if we make one choice rather than another), and
(2) the problem of constructing a true moral theory (which Parfit calls Theory X) that is adequate to deal with this fact.
(ad 1): I thought it is self-evident that many of our actions, often very small and unintentional ones, may affect who comes into existence later. But does it matter? Is it really important who comes into existence, as long as somebody does? We have no or little control over most of our actions, consequences of our actions are often non-intentional, and therefore not subject to moral judgments. Even if some of our actions are so significant and strong that they must have some important effects on future generations, we have no way of assessing what future generations would have looked like without our imput.
(ad 2): From the last sentence of my comment on (1) it follows that a “true moral theory” dealing with “the fact that the identities of those affected by our choices may be altered by the choices we make”, if at all possible, will not be able, in principle, to cover a large and possibly the largest part of our actions.

With regard to (1) Parfit argues that a large-scale public policy may in a couple of centuries so change the course of events that no one will exist who would have existed had a different policy been adopted. This follows, Parfit thinks, from: The Time-Dependence Claim: If any particular person had not been conceived within a month of the time when he was in fact conceived, he would in fact never have existed (351). Why within a month? Certainly even a second may make all the difference, because different sperm would almost certainly be involved. Of course the fact that policy choices might completely alter a population does not follow from the time-dependence claim alone. Some auxiliary assumptions must be also made about the effects of public policies on human reproduction. Parfit also assumes that one could not have been conceived by parents other than one’s actual parents. (This and the time-dependence claim seem questionable only from such unlikely metaphysical standpoints as the doctrine of pre-existence of souls.) These necessary auxiliary assumptions seem plausible. It is true, of course, that different parents could not have produced me, but the same parents may produce different offspring, not only because the genes in eggs and sperm differ, but also because the time of conception and birth is important. A baby is likely to be very sensitive to its first experiences in the womb and after birth (compare the imprinting of birds: probably not as clearcut in humans, but nevertheless of some importance, although I admit that my knowledge of develomental psychology is non-existent). Or take the example of identical twins: they are indeed very similar, but still different identities. Not only the genes, but the environmental conditions guiding the expression of genes, are important in forming the character of a person. But even if environmental conditions are practically identical, the fact of spatial separateness would still make them different identities.

Parfit next observes that moral choices are of three kinds:

1 The same people will have existed regardless of which action we take (same-people choices)
Many of one’s actions will not affect who will come into existence, but many others will, and many of them unintentional and beyond our control.
2 Different people will have existed if we take one action rather than others, but their numbers will have been the same (same-number choices)
Same comment as for previous.
3 Different numbers of (different) people will have existed depending on our choice (different-number choices).
Same as for last two points.

Traditional moral thinking usually concerns same-people choices. (This is true even in life-and-death decisions, because even if a person dies as a result of a decision, that person will still have existed.) But moral thinking about future generations usually concerns different-number choices. Same-number choices are an intermediate case. Chapter 16 examines same-number choices as a preliminary to considering different number choices, which are more problematic.
The appropriate moral principles for same-number choices, according to Parfit, are:

The Same Number Quality Claim (Q): If in either of two possible outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it would be worse if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived. (360) We do not have any real control over who might live and who might not and The No-Difference View: It makes no difference to the morality of an act whether the same people or different people will have existed if we act otherwise. (367, 369) As for last point The No-Difference View can be more fully articulated as follows: If choice C1 is between outcome A and outcome B happening to the same people and choice C2 is between outcome A happening to one set of people and outcome B happening to a different set, then there is no moral difference between the choices (outcome A is of equal value in either choice, and so is outcome B).
Q and the No-Difference View, both of which Parfit affirms, conflict with a plausible alternative:

The Person-Affecting View (V): It will be worse if [specific] people [who would exist no matter what we choose] are affected for the worse. (370) I take this to mean: if choice C1 is between outcome A and outcome B happening to the same people and choice C2 is between outcome A happening to one set of people and outcome B happening to a different set, and if outcome B is the worst of the two, then B is worse if it results from choice C1 rather than from choice C2.
But another interpretation is: If choice C is between outcome A and outcome B and B is worse for some people (who would exist in A) than A is

Parfit illustrates the differences among these views by various hypothetical examples. Among these are:

The example of depletion vs. conservation: Under the policy of depletion the quality of life would be slightly better for everyone for 200 years than under conservation but thereafter it would be considerably worse. Parfit supposes that after 200 years of the policy of depletion an entirely different population will exist than would have if conservation had been the policy. Hence depletion benefits those who live for the first 200 years and is worse for no one who is born later (since without the policy these people would not have existed: At first glance this statement seems to be nonsense. Are those people who do exist - although they are not the same as those who would exist without our actions - not worth considering?). It is therefore worse for no one, period. (Nevertheless, Q implies that depletion is wrong. V, by contrast, implies that conservation is wrong because depletion is worse for no one, but conservation is worse for those who live in the first 200 years.)
The example of two medical programs: Two proposed medical programs have identical costs and effects, except that one would cure 1000 already existing fetuses of a handicap, while the other would instead of curing these fetuses prevent the same handicap in 1000 people yet to be conceived. (V implies that the policy which would prevent the handicap is worse, but the No-Difference View implies that these policies are morally equivalent.)

Parfit thinks these examples show that we should accept Q and the No-Difference View and reject V. If so, then we have sound principles for dealing with same-number choices. That is the main point of Chapter 16. Though Parfit’s view is intuitively appealing, this is not a conclusive argument. There may be many other ways of justifying one policy over the other in each of these examples.
Parfit does consider one such alternative justification: that depletion is bad not because it lowers the general quality of life but because it violates the rights of future generations. But there are, as he notes, at least two problems with this claim. One is that it is not obvious that future generations have a right to a high quality of life (especially if, as in Parfit’s example, their quality of life, even in the depletion scenario, is higher than ours). The second problem is that we can hardly be said to be violating the rights of people by depleting the resources available to them if the only other option (as in Parfit’s example) is that they never exist. People’s rights cannot, in other words, be violated by a policy to which they owe their (reasonably worthwhile) existence.

Finally, Parfit draws a preliminary conclusion about the desired theory X. Many moral theories evaluate an action as better or worse only insofar as it is better or worse for the people whom it affects. Parfit characterizes such theories as having a person-affecting form (371, 378). Parfit argues that the correct general theory X will not have a person-affecting form. He claims that this conclusion follows from the No-Difference View together with the assumption that to cause to exist is not a benefit. This argument, first developed on pp. 369-371, and summarized at the bottom of p. 378, may be more fully articulated as follows:

(1) It makes no difference to the morality of an act whether the same people or different people will have existed if we act otherwise. (No-Difference View)
This does not make sense. How can we possibly know whether the same or different people will exist in the future (see above)
(2) Causing to exist is not a benefit.

(3) There is a unique true theory X.

So (4) The true theory X will not have a person-affecting form (i.e., will not consider an action as better or worse only insofar as it is better or worse for the people whom it affects). Unfortunately, the conclusion doesn’t follow directly from the stated premises. Yet I think we can make sense of the argument by considering that there are only two ways in which an act A might be better or worse for a person whom it effects: (i) This person would have existed regardless of whether we chose an alternative action, but A is better or worse for her than the alternatives
(ii) This person would never have existed on at least some of the alternatives to A—that is, act A is part of what causes her to exist and is in that sense a benefit to her.

Now if we assume that causing to exist is not a benefit, then the only remaining way in which an act might be better or worse for a person whom it effects is if it is the result of a choice in which this person would have existed regardless of what we chose. This seems hairsplitting to me. As above: we do not know how our actions can affect the existence or non-existence of future people. Hence (still assuming that causing to exist is not a benefit), any true theory with a person-affecting form will evaluate an act as better or worse only if it is the result of a choice in which the same people would exist regardless of what we choose (same-person choice). As above: we have little control over who will exist. Therefore: (P) If causing to exist is not a benefit, then any true theory with a person-affecting form must imply that it makes some difference to the morality of an act whether the same people or different people will have existed if we act otherwise. —for our very ability to evaluate the act morally will depend on whether the same people or different people will have existed if we act otherwise.
If we now add (P) to premises (1)-(3), we obtain a valid argument that I think adequately reflects Parfit’s reasoning. Doubt remains, of course, concerning its soundness, for premises (1), (2) and (3) all are questionable.

Chapter 17: The Repugnant Conclusion

This short chapter discusses an anomaly that arises in different-number choices. The problem is that in large populations, each additional person born may lower the quality of life for all (due to overcrowding, competition for limited resources, etc.). But the total quality of life that that additional person enjoys may nevertheless outweigh the total loss of quality of life to everyone else. If so, then (assuming—and this assumption is crucial—that our goal is to maximize total quality of life) it is better for the population to increase, even though that increase may lower everyone’s quality of life, even to a level at which it is barely worth living. But this conclusion seems paradoxical and absurd. How can we possibly control all this? Parfit therefore calls it The Repugnant Conclusion. The principle that engenders the paradox is:

The Impersonal Total Principle: If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which there would be the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living. (387) If we take what makes life to be worth living as happiness, this is the classic utilitarian idea of maximizing happiness. What The Repugnant Conclusion is supposed to show is that classical utilitarianism and any other theories that assume the Impersonal Total Principle fail as candidates for Theory X. They fail, specifically, because they imply The Repugnant Conclusion (which is absurd) in certain different-number choices involving population growth.
The paradox results from the fact that in a growing population it is possible for total quality of life to increase while the average quality of life (quality per person) decreases. We might, then, in an effort to escape The Repugnant Conclusion, suppose that it is average quality of life that matters. If so, we might affirm:

The Impersonal Average Principle: If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which people’s lives go, on average, best. (386) Parfit will later show that this principle too engenders paradox.”

Considering all my previous comments, it seems to me that many of the ideas related to the non-identity problem are somewhat obscure. Who can possibly know how most of our actions will affect who will be in existence in the future and who will not. Most of our actions are unintentional, but nevertheless may have immense effects on what will happen. Remember the butterfly effect! Furthermore: it seems to me quite irrelevant to base moral judgements on whether the “same” or different people will be affected by our actions. The reason: we do not know and cannot know in principle what a future person or a future population would look like without imput from our actions. All we can hope for is that important personal or government actions will make it likely that future conditions are beneficial to mankind as a whole. And this includes policies which guarantee that resources on Earth are never over-exploited. —- Finally, in a discussion of the non-identity problem the question was raised whether a cat who by means of some treatment had acquired human mental powers, would qualify for the same moral considerations as humans. Of course it would: it would be human! —- This leads to another point: the discussion of non-identity seems to be restricted to humans (but I may be wrong on this, I am not familiar with most of the literature). I conclude with Schopenhauer:

“Die vermeintliche Rechtlosigkeit der Tiere, der Wahn, dass unser Handeln gegen sie ohne moralische Bedenken sei, ist eine geradezu empörende Barbarei des Abendlandes. Die Tiere sind kein Fabrikat zu unserem Gebrauch. Nicht Erbarmen, sondern Gerechtigkeit ist man den Tieren schuldig.
The supposed rightlessness of animals, the delusion that we can act towards them without moral scruples, is a really disgusting barbarity of the Western world. Animals are not constructs for our use. We owe them justness and not mercy.”

Schopenhauers moral philosophy based on compassion with the suffering of animals and man, appears to be a sounder basis of ethical judgments than the hairsplitting related to the non-identity problem. But I repeat: I know very little of the literature and put this post up as a basis for discussion, and only that.

THE AIM OF ALL THE ABOVE: I HOPE THAT GENUINE PHILOSOPHERS WILL CONTRIBUTE SOME COMMENTS!

I have briefly discussed Plato’s archetypes and vacant niches in two previous posts ( here and here). The detailed paper on this topic has now been accepted for publication.

Klaus Rohde: Vacant niches and the Possible Operation of Natural Laws in Ecosystems, Rivista di Biologia / Biology Forum 101 (2008)

This is a follow-up to my last post on Fraudulence in Science and Politics which concluded with the obvious, i.e., that “Whether in science, the economy or in the media, data evaluation by people whose objectivity might be jeopardized by financial or other interests, will lead to corruption.”

The importance of this became clear when I watched the Insight program on SBS dealing with the problems of genetically modified crops. A wide variety of people participated in the discussion.

What struck me most was that, apparently, no animal experiments on the toxicity etc. of new products are required, and companies, not independent researchers, have to provide the evidence that their products are not harmful. The research conducted by these companies is to a large degree non-transparent, not subjected to peer review, and not published. In other words, rules are even less strict than in the pharmaceutic industry, where animal experiments followed by clinical tests have to be submitted to authorities before new drugs are even considered for approval.

Probably the most important objection against the wide use of genetically engineered crops is the monopolization of seed supply in the hands of very few huge companies (and in some cases a single company). It leads to disappearance of biodiversity and could - in the long term - have disastrous consequences not only for the environment but for the viability of small local farms. A few days ago a large international meeting in Paris concluded that the support of small local farmers was essential to overcome the present food crisis.

Here I show what a retired professor does in his spare time. He popularizes science, as in this example!!

In a previous post I discussed Platonian archetypes and their application in ecology, with special emphasis on vacant (empty) niches. In this post I present an illustrated example.

Because the species illustrated exist in the mind of their creator, they must be considered to be archetypes. Both species have an organ, the balloon arising at their anteriors, which allows them to occupy a niche, the stratosphere, by lifting them into it whenever threatened by an enemy or in pursuit of an enemy. However, since both species have not yet made it into nature, this niche is still vacant. Of course, some people say that the niche does not yet exist, because the species have not yet occupied or “created” it. Ignore this nonsense! Scientific work should not be reduced to a squabble about semantics.

Note also that the vicious cycle continues. You may not have conquered a new niche to escape from enemies, but they will follow anyway.

I find it refreshing to find articles which disagree with the prevailing scientific dogma, such as Darwinism, which puts emphasis on selection as the main (or, apart from neutral evolution, only) driving force of evolution. Woodley’s article is such a case.

Woodley, M.A. [2007], On the possible operation of natural laws in ecosystems. Rivista di Biologia-Biology Forum 100: 475-486, suggests that natural Platonic laws may operate in ecosystems. He bases this claim on two kinds of law-like behaviour observed in nature: 1) adaptations towards specialization which can be looked at as typological lineage degeneration away from “ideal” archetypes, in which specialization makes species more sensitive to environmental perturbations; 2) occurrence of convergently evolved forms which suggest a limited number of niches or possible organismal body plans (Platonic moulds).

Ad 1) 19th century biologists like Haeckel (who was a Darwinist) and others after him have indeed distinguished successive phases of initial explosive diversification, specialization and degeneration leading to extinction in various fossil lineages (’Epacme’, ‘Acme’ and ‘Peracme’ of Ernst Haeckel [1866]. But extinction of animal groups is not a lawful phase of an evolutionary cycle, because the ancestors of extant forms have never passed through it (Rensch, B. [1954], Neuere Probleme der Abstammungslehre. Die Transspezifische Evolution. Ferdinand Enke Verlag, Stuttgart; Rensch, B. [1959], Evolution above the species level. Columbia University Press. N.Y.).

If Woodley were right, we would expect that species in high diversity regions, such as the tropics, where evolution is more advanced (Rohde, K. [1992], Latitudinal gradients in species diversity: the search for the primary cause. Oikos 65: 514-527) should have narrower niches (e.g., latitudinal ranges, habitats, etc.) than species in low diversity regions (at higher latitudes). However, a recent meta-analysis of the latitude niche breadth hypothesis and computer simulations failed to find support for it. Likewise, Rapoport’s rule, according to which latitudinal ranges are generally wider at high latitudes, does not generally apply to animals and plants.

Also, Kaufman’s work (Kaufman, S.A. [1993]. The origins of order. Self-organization and selection in evolution. Oxford University Press, New York Oxford) and some other recent studies suggest that evolution is not driven exclusively by natural selection, but that many characters evolve not because but in spite of selection: “spontaneous order is everywhere present’ and ‘many conceivable useful phenotypes do not exist’. He uses rugged fitness landscapes to illustrate the process of evolution. However, peaks in rugged fitness landscapes (which might at first glance be considered to be equivalent to archetypes) are not constant, and it is therefore doubtful that the peaks in such fitness landscapes correspond to Platonic archetypes.

Ad 2) In his discussion of the second point (limited number of available niches suggested by convergences), Woodley proceeds from Hutchinson’s niche definition as a species’ place in a multidimensional hyperspace and concludes that “in the absence of species distributions, the niche can have no substance, thus indicating that ‘vacant niche’ is simply a non-descriptive term at best”. But Hutchinson himself used the term “vacant niche”, and there is indeed no reason, even in the context of Hutchinson’s definition, why one shoud not refer to the possibility of the existence of more places in multidimensional hyperspace than are actually apparent (or “filled”) at at a particular point in time. One might prefer the term “potential” or “virtual” niches, but the term “vacant niche” has the advantage that it draws attention to the possibility that more species can be accommodated without the necessity of compressing already filled ones. As pointed out by Rohde, K. [2005], Nonequilibrium Ecology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: “A vacant or empty niche, thus, is simply a concise way of saying that more species could exist in a habitat, as suggested by comparative studies.” - On the other hand, Woodley admits the existence of vacant niches in the Platonian context: “The existence of a vacant niche when considered in the above light is also significant, as it indicates that abstract form, wholly separate from its biological realization, can exist within an ecological context. Species are attracted to and can evolve to fill niche vacancies, and in doing so can acquire a range of forms that would at least be in part predictable from a study of the vacancy.” Nevertheless, the number of niches must be limited, because onvergence and orthoselection occur in evolution and must be the result of the limited number of ‘Platonic moulds’. “However it is not the quality of the environment that is necessarily provoking the adaptation, it is indeed the degree of competition which forces a species to specialize.”

Generally, according to Woodley, whereas the prevailing Darwinian view assumes that evolution is primarily driven by contingencies, the typological view holds that evolution in ecosystems is essentially deterministic and orthogenetic. Importantly also, Woodley believes that convergent forms occur because they are useful for the ecosystem.

Empirical evidence does not support the view that evolution has filled all possible niches. There has been an accumulation of taxa in the course of evolution to the Recent, and there is no evidence that this accumulation was accompanied by a corresponding compression of niches. ” Examining species diversity of various groups in ecosystems as diverse as marine benthos, insects of fern, or parasites of marine and freshwater fishes, the conclusion must be that ” considering the vast differences in diversity of similar habitats or hosts ” only a small proportion of potential niches is occupied, which makes it unlikely that interspecific competition is of such overriding importance as often assumed (see the recent discussion in Rohde 2005).

I conclude that ‘natural laws’ are indeed likely to exist in nature which force evolution into certain ‘moulds’, although it is doubtful that these moulds are constant and correspond to Plato’s archetypes. There is no substantial evidence which supports the view that adaptive radiation generally is a lawful process of lineage degeneration, from less to more specialized forms. There is much evidence in support of the view that niche space is largely empty; the term ‘vacant niche’ is appropriate and useful for drawing attention to this. Interspecific competition is probably not as important as often assumed. - Woodley’s claim that “convergent forms occur because they are useful for the ecosystem” is not supported by any evidence and it seems indeed highly unlikely that this suggestion can even in principle be supported by empirical evidence.

See also

http://blog.une.edu.au/klausrohde/2007/01/31/vacant-niches/

and

http://blog.une.edu.au/klausrohde/2007/02/24/effective-evolutionary-time/

and

Food Web Theory Suggests Ecology May Be Governed By General Rules

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2000/03/000309074625.htm

I refer to an article by Gerard Wright in the Sydney Morning Herald April 7, 08 which discusses the subprime mortgage crisis and implications for the banks.

In the US, in 2006, there were 5.6 million households with mortgages with negative equity (that is, a mortgage higher than the value of the house). It is estimated that this will increase to 10.76 million by the end of the year and may even reach 20 million. Many families will be forced to leave their homes to banks and simply walk away. The social costs will be enormous.

What are the reasons?

According to Dean Baker of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in the US culture of the last 20 years the norm has been to rip off everything you can. He further says that the banking landscape will change. “You are talking about a large amount of defaults, way beyond any historical pattern”. Gerald Cassidy, a senior researcher with RBC Capital Markets, predicts 150 bank failures over the next three years.

Does all this require only minor adjustments, or is a complete change in our philosophical attitudes and in the economic paradigm (largely uncontrolled free market economy) underlying economic policy necessary? Not long ago the Soviet system was overthrown as a consequence of its rigid economic and political structures, which prevented any meaningful adjustments. Has the time come to throw overboard the laissez-faire economy with its emphasis on more and more growth, and, more generally, our economic greed: let’s get as much as possible, whether you need it or not? Sokrates said looking at items for sale: how many things there are which I don’t need.

Such a change would solve many of the environmental problems, which are usually little considered when calculating the costs of things.

For free market economy see also http://blog.une.edu.au/klausrohde/2007/02/05/free-market-economy/